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Oil and Gas: Unit v. Borehole Pooling: Where Do
We Stand After Amoco Production Co. And Its
Progeny?
Some of the most significant issues in oil and gas law today surround the
Amoco Production Co. v. Corporation Commission decision.' Amoco ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (the
"Commission") has the authority to force pool 2 the owners of the right to
drill by the borehole rather than by the drilling and spacing unit.4 This issue
is significant when owners of the right to drill, who elect not to participate
in the drilling of the initial well in the unit, demand to participate in increased
density wells5 drilled in the unit. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals opinion,
as modified by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 6 concluded that "[p]ooling by
the wellbore is not just and reasonable ' 7 and that "granting a second election
[for an increased density well] is a deprivation of a property right of the
initial risk capital investors," i.e., the participants in the original well. The
court also concluded that this deprivation of property rights was a violation
of substantive due process as guaranteed by the state and federal constitu-
tions.9 The Court of Appeals also stated that the Commission exceeded its
jurisdiction because it was attempting to try title to the land. 10
Amoco is significant because the Oklahoma Supreme Court, for the first
time, adopted the position that a forced pooling order binds the rights of the
owners of the right to drill, who elected not to participate in the drilling of
the initial well, for all the wells drilled in the unit. Before Amoco was decided,
most parties to forced pooling orders treated the forced pooling orders as if
the orders only pooled the original borehole. In other words, when a well
operator" wanted to drill an increased density well within the unit, an
1. 751 P.2d 203 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986), modifying 57 OKLA. B.J. 1961. The opinion, as
modified by the Oklahoma Supreme Court Order on certiorari dated Dec. 16, 1987, was expressly
adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id. The modification limited the holding in this case
as prospective in all matters where the order of the Corporation Commission was not final as of
the date of mandate, which was Feb. 19, 1988.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 21-29.
3. Pooling by the borehole has been defined as "[p]ooling limited and designed to cover only
one bore hole and the production from those formations tested or established to be productive of
hydrocarbons within the unit, as distinguished from pooling of an entire drilling and spacing unit
for all formations." 8 H. WVumAms & C. MEYERS, OiL AND GAs LAw 728 (1987) [hereinafter Om.
AND GAs LAw].
4. See infra text accompanying notes 22-31.
5. See infra text accompanying note 42.
6. See supra note 1.
7. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 206-07.
8. Id. at 207.
9. Id. at 207-08.
10. Id. at 208.
11. A well operator has been defined as "[a] person, natural or artificial (e.g., corporate)
engaged in the business of drilling wells for oil and gas." 8 Om AND GAs LAw at 662.
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additional application for a forced pooling order was again made. Although
Amoco effectively ended this practice, many unanswered questions remain.
This note addresses three of the most pressing question presented by Amoco.
First, this note analyzes the basis upon which the court reasoned that the
forced pooling statute, equity, and substantive due process dictated that the
original forced pooling order binds the rights of the owners of the right to
drill, who elected not to participate in the drilling of the initial well, for all
subsequent wells drilled in the unit. Second, this note discusses the jurisdic-
tional limits of the Commission in reviewing forced pooling orders. Finally,
consideration is given to whether there are circumstances under which a court
might find it equitable to pool by the borehole,
The Historical Significance of the Pooling Statute
Because of the migratory nature of oil and gas, a mineral owner usually
cannot produce oil and gas from a common source of supply without draining
some of the oil and gas underlying an adjacent owner's property.'2 Based on
this phenomenon, the early courts adopted the "rule of capture"' 3 to govern
oil and gas property law.' 4 Under the rule of capture mineral owners have
the right to use reasonable means to produce the oil and gas under the land,
even though it is being drained from beneath the land of another owner,
provided the producing owners remain within their vertical boundaries."
Correspondingly, once mineral owners 6 have leased their mineral interests,
the lessee (commonly known as the working interest owner or leasehold
owner) steps into the shoes of the mineral owner and has the same right to
utilize the rule of capture to extract the oil and gas.
Although the rule of capture grants an owner the right to capture, the
owner's rights must be exercised with due regard for the rights of the other
12. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 201 (1900). See also I E. KuNrz, OIL AND GAS
§§ 2.2, 2.3 (1962) (general discussion of the physical characteristics of oil and gas).
13. The rule of capture has been defined as "[t]he legal rule of non-liability for (1) causing
oil or gas to migrate across property lines and (2) producing oil or gas that was originally in place
under the land of another, so long as the producing well does not trespass." 9 OmL AND GAS LAW
at 869.
14. See, e.g., Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co, v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 A. 724
(1889); Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
15. See generally I E. Kunsrz, supra note 12, §§ 4.1-.2, See, e.g., Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla.
204, 177 P. 86 (1918). In Rich, the court stated that oil and gas constitutes "a sort of subterranean
ferae naturae," meaning that the owner of the land overlying the oil and gas reserve does not
have an absolute right or title to the oil and gas lying below the land. Id,, 177 P. at 89. However,
the owner does have the exclusive right to explore for oil and gas by drilling wells and reducing
to possession the hydrocarbons which are discovered. Once the owner reduces such oil and gas to
possession, absolute title is acquired. Id, See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 208
(1900); Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 24 Cal. App. 2d 587, 76 P.2d 167,
175 (1938).
16. A mineral owner is an owner of the property interest created in oil and gas or other
minerals after a severance of the minerals from the surface, "The prime characteristic [of a mineral
interest] is the right to enter the land to explore, drill, produce and otherwise carry on mining
activities." 8 OIL AND GAS LAW at 562.
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mineral owners within the common source of supply.17 These reciprocal rights
and duties among the owners are known as correlative rights. Correlative
rights include the right against waste of extracted substances, against spoilage
of the common source of supply, against malicious depletion of the common
source of supply and the right to a fair opportunity to extract oil or gas.'
Courts adopted the doctrine of correlative rights to regulate the rights of
mineral owners overlying a common source of supply and to ensure that
unbridled application of the rule of capture would not result in waste and
injury to the common source.
9
Steps to Obtaining a Forced Pooling Order
Today, when an owner of the right to drill, usualiy an unleased mineral
owner or a leasehold owner, decides to drill a well, the owner will first file
an application with the Commission to establish drilling and spacing units
for the area of the proposed well. These drilling and spacing units cover the
common sources of supply that the applicant believes are potentially produc-
tive.20 The Oklahoma legislature has given the Commission the power to
establish drilling and spacing units covering common sources of supply.2' The
purpose of a drilling and spacing unit is to prevent waste and to protect the
correlative rights of interested parties.? The power to establish drilling and
17. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1900). See also 1 E. KUTZ, supra note
12, at § 4.3.
18. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1900). See also 1 E. KtNTZ, supra note
12, at § 4.3.
19. 1 W. Strmsas, On. AND GAS § 63 (1954). Professor Summers recognizes that the doctrine
of correlative rights was a necessary result of the law of capture in order to prevent injury to the
common source of supply and to ensure that no owner took an undue proportion. The doctrine
was summarized in Kingwood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 396 P.2d 1008 (Okla. 1964) as
follows:
'[C]orrelative rights' has been defined as a convenient method of 'indicating that
each owner of land in a common source of supply of oil and gas has legal privileges
as against other owners of land therein to take oil and gas therefrom by lawful
operations conducted on his own land limited, however, by duties to other owners
not to injure the source of supply and by duties not to take an undue proportion
of the oil and gas.'
Id. at 1010 (quoting I W. SUmE~sn, O ANDi GAS § 63 (1954)).
20. See Nesbitt, A Primer on Forced Pooling of Oil and Gas Interests in Oklahoma, 50 OGA.
B.J. 648, 648-49 [hereinafter A Primer on Forced Pooling].
21. This statute provides:
To prevent or to assist in preventing the various types of waste of oil or gas
prohibited by statute, or any of said wastes, or to protect or assist in protecting the
correlative rights of interested parties, the Corporation Commission, upon a proper
application and notice given as hereinafter provided, and after a hearing as provided
in said notice, shall have the power to establish weil spacing and drilling units of
specified and approximately uniform size and shape covering any common source
of supply, or prospective common source of supply, of oil or gas within the state
of Oklahoma ....
52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(1) (Supp. 1988).
22. Id.
1989] NO TES
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
spacing units is found in the state's police power to protect public interest
through prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights.
23
In exercising this power, the Commission conducts a hearing after proper
notice of the spacing application has been given to the mineral and leasehold
owners. At the hearing, parties present the proposed well spacing plan for
the common source(s) of supply. Evidence is also presented as to the depth
at which production has been or is expected to be found, the nature and
character of the producing or prospective producing formations, and any
other geological or scientific data which would be probative ip determining
the drilling and spacing units. 24 After the hearing the Commission issues an
order establishing the drilling and spacing units for the common source(s) of
supply. The order sets forth the formations spaced by the order; the outside
boundaries of the surface area included in the order; the size, form and shape
of the unit; the drilling pattern for the area and the location of the permitted
well on each unit.2
Unless the Commission grants permission, only one well may be drilled in
an established unit.26 This one-well-per-unit determination protects the public
interest by restricting initial development activity within the unit to those
conditions which exist and are known at the time the unit is created. In this
manner, unnecessary wells are not drilled. In addition, further development
of the unit is conditioned on whether information obtained from the initial
well which shows that additional wells are needed for proper drainage of the
common source of supply.27
In exercising its authority under the spacing statute, the Commission must
also recognize the rights of all interest owners to drill the unit well or otherwise
23. Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938), appeal dismissed,
305 U.S. 376 (1939).
24. The Oklahoma legislature has provided that, in establishing a drilling and spacing unit for
a common source of supply, the following evidence shall be material:
(1) The lands embraced in the actual or prospective common source of supply; (2)
the plan of well spacing then being employed or contemplated in said source of
supply; (3) the depth at which production from said common source of supply has
been or is expected to be found; (4) the nature and character of the producing or
prospective producing formation or formations; and (5) any other available geological
or scientific data pertaining to said actual or prospective source of supply which
may be of probative value to said Commission in determining the proper spacing
and well drilling unit therefor, with due and relative allowance for the correlative
rights and obligations of the producers and royalty owners interested therein.
52 OKIA. STAT. § 87.1(c) (Supp. 1988).
25. 52 OLA. STAT. § 87.1(c) (Supp. 1988).
26. The pertinent statute provides, in relevant part, that:
The drilling of any well or wells into any common source of supply for the purpose
of producing oil or gas therefrom, after a spacing order has been entered by the
Commission covering such common source of supply, at a location other than that
fixed by said order is hereby prohibited. The drilling of any well or wells into a
common source of supply, covered by a pending spacing application, at a location
other than that approved by a special order of the Commission authorizing the
drilling of such well is hereby prohibited ....
52 OKLa. STAT. § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1988).
27. Corporation Comm'n v. Union Oil Co., 591 P.2d 711 (Okla. 1979).
[Vol. 42
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss4/15
19891 NOTES
share in the production therefrom. These rights attach when the Commission
establishes the drilling and spacing unit.2s Thus, before owners develop a
drilling and spacing unit, the owners of the right to drill should first agree
on how they will develop the unit and on how they will determine their
proportionate share of the production.
If an agreement cannot be reached, owners may seek recourse under the
provisions of the pooling statute.29 Any owner of the right to drill may apply
28. Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 (1950), Ward v.
Corporation Comm'n, 501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972).
29. See supra note 26. The remainder of the section provides, in relevant part, that:
When two or more separately owned tracts of land are embraced within an established
spacing unit, or where there are undivided interests separately owned, or both such
separately owned tracts and undivided interests embraced within such established
spacing unit, the owners thereof may validly pool their interests ... and where one
such separate owner has drilled or proposes to drill a well on said unit to the
common source of supply, the Commission, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary
wells, or to protect correlative rights, shall, upon a proper application therefore and
a hearing thereon, require such owners to pool and develop their lands in the spacing
unit as a unit .... All orders requiring such pooling shall be ... upon such terms
and conditions as are just and reasonable and will afford to the owner of such tract
in the unit the opportunity to recover or receive without unnecessary expense his
just and fair share of the oil and gas. The portion of the production allocated to
the owner of each tract or interests included in a well spacing unit formed by a
pooling order shall, when produced, be considered as, if produced by such owner
from the separately owned tract or interest by a well drilled thereon. Such pooling
order of the Commission shall make definite provisions for the payment of cost of
the development and operation, which shall be limited to the actual expenditures
required for such purpose not in excess of what are reasonable, including a reasonable
charge for supervision. In the event of any dispute relative to such costs, the
Commission shall determine the proper costs after due notice to interested parties
and a hearing thereon. The operator of such unit, in addition to any other right
provided by the pooling order or orders of the Commission, shall have a lien on
the mineral leasehold estate or rights owned by the other owners therein and upon
their shares of the production from such unit to the extent that costs incurred in
the development and operation upon said unit are a charge against such interest by
order of the Commission or by operation of law. Such liens shall be separable as
to each separate owner within such unit, and shall remain liens until the owner or
owners drilling or operating the well have been paid the amount due under the terms
of the pooling order. The Commission is specifically authorized to provide that the
owner or owners drilling, or paying for the drilling, or for the operation of a well
for the benefit of all shall be entitled to production from such well which would be
received by the owner or owners for whose benefit the well was drilled or operated,
after payment of royalty, until the owner or owners drilling or operating the well
have been paid the amount due under the terms of the pooling order or order
settling such dispute. No part of the production or proceeds accruing to any owner
of a separate interest in such unit shall be applied toward payment of any cost
properly chargeable to any other interest in said unit.
For the purpose of this section, the owner or owners of oil and gas rights in and
under an unleased tract of land shall be regarded as a lessee to the extent of a
seven-eighths (7/8) interest in and to said rights and a lessor to the extent of the
remaining one-eighth (1/8) interest therein. Should the owners of separate tracts or
interests embraced within a spacing unit fail to agree upon a pooling of their interests
and the drilling of a well on the unit, and should it be established by final,
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
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to the Commission for a forced pooling order. After proper notice is given
to the owners of the right to drill, the Commission conducts a hearing. At
the hearing evidence is presented as to the value of the interests of the owners
in the drilling and spacing unit. Evidence is presented as to the value of the
oil and gas leases in the area of the proposed well? 0 The value of the leases
is usually specified in terms of a bonus3' paid for the lease and a royalty32
to be given the mineral owner if production is obtained. Evidence is also
heard as to the terms of any farmout agreement33 between leasehold owners
unappealable judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction that the Commission is
without authority to require pooling as provided for herein, then, subject to all other
applicable provisions of this act, the owner of each tract or interest embraced within
a spacing unit may drill on his separately owned tract, and the allowable production
therefrom shall be that portion of the allowable for the full spacing unit as the area
of such separately owned tract bears to the full spacing unit.
In the event a producing well or wells are completed upon a unit where there are,
or may thereafter be, two or more separately owned tracts, the first purchaser or
purchasers shall be liable to any royalty owner or group of royalty owners holding
the royalty interest under a separately owned tract included in such drilling and
spacing unit for the payment of proceeds from the sale of production from the
drilling and spacing unit. Each royalty interest owner shall share in all production
from the well or wells drilled within the unit, or in the gas well rental provided for
in the lease covering such separately owned tract or interest in lieu of the customary
fixed royalty, to the extent of such royalty interest owner's interest in the unit. Each
royalty interest owner's interest in the unit shall be defined as the percentage of
royalty, including the normal one-eighth (1/8) royalty, overriding royalties or other
excess royalties owned in each separate tract by the royalty owner, multiplied by the
proportion that the acreage in each separately owned tract or interest bears to the
entire acreage of the unit. The first purchaser or purchasers shall also be jointly and
severally liable for the payment to each royalty interest owner of any production
payments or other obligations for the payment of monies contained within the leases
covering any lands lying within the drilling and spacing unit ....
52 0KLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1988).
It should be noted that before the Corporation Commission will have jurisdiction to force pool
the interests of any owners, a drilling and spacing unit must exist as to the formations which the
applicant wishes to force pool. Id.
30. A Primer on Force Pooling at 650. The author notes that little consideration is given to
evidence of transactions outside a nine section area of which the subject section is the center. Id.
31. Bonus is usually cash consideration given in lieu of the right to participate in the working
interest of the well. Bonus may also take the form of an overriding royalty (or excess royalty).
For a definition of royalty, see infra note 32. The amount and elements of the bonus are intended
to equal the current fair market value of an oil and gas lease. A Primer on Forced Pooling at
650.
32. Royalty has been defined as "[t]he landowner's share of production, free of expense of
production." 8 On. D GAs LAw at 856. The Oklahoma legislature has determined that all
mineral/land owners are entitled to a statutory 1/8 royalty interest which is unaffected by a forced
pooling. 52 Oia.A. STAT. § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1988). An overriding royalty has been defined as "[aln
interest in oil and gas produced at the surface, free of the expenses of production, and in addition
to the usual landowner's royalty reserved to the lessor in an oil and gas lease." 8. On. AND GAS
LAW at 674.
33. A farmout agreement has been defined as "[an] agreement between operators, whereby a
lease owner not desirous of drilling at the time agrees to assign the lease, or some portion of it.
.. to another operator who is desirous of drilling the tract. The assignor in such a deal may or
may not retain an overriding royalty or production payment." 8 OinLD GAs LAW at 342.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss4/15
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in the area of the proposed well. Additionally, evidence is heard as to the
cost of drilling the well. Ordinarily, the cost is expressed in two terms: an
estimated dry hole cost and an estimated completed well cost.
4
After the hearing, the Commission issues a forced pooling order, imposing
a forced election on the uncommitted owners as to the disposition of their
interests in the unit. The forced election gives each owner two basic options.
The owner may either participate in the proposed well by paying the owner's
proportionate part of the completed well costs,3" or not participate, accept a
bonus and, if production is obtained, a royalty. Usually, the forced pooling
order will provide an option between receiving a higher royalty with less or
no bonus, or a smaller royalty with a higher bonus. The forced pooling order
typically gives the owners fifteen days in which to choose the terms under
which they desire to proceed. If owners do not make an election, the forced
pooling order specifies the terms under which they will be bound.1
6
The forced pooling order also designates which owner will be the operator
of the well. Often, the applicant owns the majority interest in the spacing
unit and is named the operator. However, there may be a disagreement
between lessees over operations, in which case the Commission will hear
evidence as to the qualifications of the lessees. 37 The Commission considers
the percentage of working interest held by each contender. The owner of the
largest share of working interest has the best chance of being appointed
operator; however, other factors are considered. These factors include actual
exploration activity in the area, the number of wells operated in the area,
the extent of developed and undeveloped land each contender has leased in
the area, the availability of operating personnel and facilities, a comparison
of proposed costs of drilling and operating the well, and the relative experience
and competence of the contenders for operating rights.38
A forced pooling order also specifies the date by which the operator must
commence the well. Usually, an order gives the operator 120 days from the
date of the order to commence the well. The order will provide that if the
well has not been commenced within the period provided, the order will be
null and void by its own terms. An expired order cannot be reinstated. If an
applicant wishes to drill a well after the original order has expired, the pooling
process must be repeated from the beginning, including the payment of
bonuses.39
Once the initial unit well is drilled, geological datae may indicate that one
or more additional wells is needed for proper drainage of the common source
34. A Primer on Forced Pooling at 649-50.
35. The well cost contained in the pooling order is an estimate only and a party, by electing
to participate in the well, assumes an obligation to pay his or her proportionate share of the
actual costs of the well. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission retains jurisdiction to determine
proper costs in the event there is a dispute as to the actual costs. If a dry hole is drilled, the
operator is required to return any money a participating party has paid that has not been spent
on the well. Id.
36. Id. at 652.
37. Id. at 653.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. When a well is drilled, a record is kept of the formations penetrated by the well, including
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
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of supply. If such data is present an owner of the right to drill, usually the
operator, may apply to the Commission for permission to drill one or more
increased density wells.4
The drilling of these wells is provided for by the increased density statute.
42
This statute gives the Commission jurisdiction to "permit additional wells
... within the established unit, upon proper proof.., that such modification
or extension of the order establishing drilling or spacing units will prevent or
assist in preventing ... [waste], or will protect or assist in protecting the
correlative rights of persons interested in said common source of supply
.. ..-41 Case law has established that before the Commission can permit
additional wells in the unit, a party requesting to drill an additional well must
prove there has been a change in condition or new knowledge of a condition
since the unit was established. 44
Amoco Production Co. v. Corporation Commission
In Amoco Production Co. v. Corporation Commission,4 Amoco challenged
a Commission ruling" which held that an original forced pooling order of
the Commission 47 applied only to the drilling of the initial well and not the
subsequent increased density wells in the unit. According to the Commission,
the parties who elected not to participate in the original well had the oppor-
depth, thickness, and if possible their contents. This record is called a well log. 8 Orr, AN GAs
LAW at 1071.
41. Nesbitt, The Forced Pooling Order: How Long? How Wide? How Deep?, 52 OKLA. B.J.
2799, 2799 (1981).
42. This statute provides that:
The Commission shall have jurisdiction ... to decrease the size of the well spacing
units or to permit additional wells to be drilled within the established units, upon
proper proof at such hearing that such modification or extension of the order
establishing drilling or spacing units will prevent or assist in preventing the various
types of wastes prohibited by statute, or any of said wastes, or will protect or assist
in protecting the correlative rights of persons interested in said common source of
supply, or upon the filing of a proper application therefor to enlarge the area covered
by the spacing order, if such proof discloses that the development or the trend of
development indicates that such common source of supply underlies an area not
covered by the spacing order and such proof discloses that the applicant is an owner
within the area covered by the application.
52 OKLA. STAT, § 87,1(d) (Supp, 1988).
43. Id.
44. Wood Oil Co, v. Corporation Comm'n, 205 Okla. 534, 239 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1950) (the
Corporation Commission is without authority to modify a previous order absent a showing of
substantial change of condition in the area); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 482
P.2d 607, 611 (Okla. 1971) (the phrase "change in knowledge of conditions" encompasses an
acquisition of additional or new data which requires a reevaluation of the geological opinion
concerning the reservoirs); French v. Champlin Exploration, Inc,, 534 P.2d 1302, 1306 (Okla.
1975) (additional knowledge gained from subsequent development sustained the Corporation
Commission's modification of its prior order so as to permit additional wells in the unit),
45. 751 P.2d 203 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
46. Okla. Corp. Comm'n Order No. 270540 (Dec. 20, 1984).
47. Okla. Corp. Comm'n Order No. 199609 (Oct. 1, 1981).
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tunity to make new elections and participate in the subsequent wells in the
unit. Amoco argued that once the Commission issued a forced pooling order
it applied to the initial well and all subsequent increased density wells in the
unit, and therefore no new elections to participate should be permitted.
4
In Amoco, R & R Exploration Company applied to the Commission to
force pool the interests of the owners in a 640-acre drilling and spacing unit.
The Commission pooled sixteen common sources of supply. Among these
were the Springer and Red Fork formations. Amoco was appointed as the
operator of the well. The other owners of the right to drill were given the
option to: 1) participate by rendering their share of the drilling costs, or 2)
elect not to participate and receive either; a) cash with an excess royalty
interest of 1/16 of 8/8 plus the statutory 1/8 of 8/8; or b) no cash with an
excess royalty of 1/8 of 8/8 plus the statutory 1/8 of 8/8.49 Ladd Petroleum
Company, a mineral owner, and R & R Exploration, a leasehold owner,
elected not to participate and chose the third option of receiving the excess
royalty.50
After R & R elected not to participate, it assigned its interest in the unit
to Bartex Exploration, Inc. After Ladd made its election, it executed an oil
and gas lease covering its interest in favor of Berexco, Inc."
Amoco drilled and completed the well in the Springer formation within the
time prescribed by the Commission. The well, known as the Hunnicutt No.
1, was then shut-in 2 for fourteen months awaiting a pipeline connection. 3
Immediately after the Hunnicutt No. 1 well was connected to the pipeline,
Amoco commenced operations on the Hunnicutt No. 2 well as a proposed
Red Fork test welP within the same 640-acre unit as the Hunnicutt No. 1.
After learning of the second well, Bartex and Berexco informed Amoco that
they would elect to participate in the Hunnicutt No. 2.
Amoco informed Bartex and Berexco that they did not have the right to
make such an election because their predecessors in interest elected not to
participate in the drilling of the Hunnicutt No. 1 well. 5 Amoco argued that
once an election has been made not to participate in the exploration and
development of the drilling and spacing units and common sources of supply
covered by a Commission order, no new elections may be made in wells
48. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 205.
49. Okla. Corp. Comm'n Order No. 199609 (Oct. 1, 1981). See also supra text accompanying
note 34.
50. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 205. See also Reply Brief of Appellant, Amoco Prod.
Co., to Petition for Rehearing of Berexco, Inc. with Combined Brief in Support Thereof at 2
[hereinafter Reply Brief of Appellant]; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751 P.2d 203
(Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (No. 63664).
51. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 205.
52. A shut-in well has been defined as "[a] producing well that has been closed down
temporarily for [lack of a pipeline connection], repairs, cleaning out, building up pressure, lack
of a market, etc." 8 Om AND GAs LAw at 909.
53. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 205.
54. A test well has been defined as "lain exploratory well drilled to determine whether a
particular horizon will be productive of minerals." 8 Om. A GAs LAW at 998.
55. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 205.
1989]
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which are a part of such exploration and development. Amoco asserted that
the Hunnicutt No. 2 was a part of the exploration and development of the
Commission order covering the Hunnicutt No. 1.56
Bartex requested the Commission enter an order determining the rights and
equities of Bartex under the original pooling order as to the common sources
of supply and drilling and spacing units. Berexco intervened to support Bartex
and requested that the Commission make the same determination for it."
The Commission entered an order granting Bartex and Berexco the right
to participate in the working interest in the Hunnicutt No. 2 and any other
subsequent wells drilled in the unit. 8 The Commission found that the fourteen
month period which elapsed between the drilling of the wells was "more than
sufficient in which to attempt a completion or evaluation by testing any of
the formations above the Springer [of which the Red Fork is one] and having
failed to do so, [Amoco] exceeded a 'reasonable period of time' [in which
to drill]." '59 The Commission stated that the fourteen month period "clearly
separate[d] the two wells in such a fashion so that the Hunnicutt No. 2-29
could not be construed as a continuation of [the] drilling operations"' 6° for
the Hunnicutt No. 1. Amoco appealed the Commission's order.
On appeal, Amoco argued that the original pooling order 61 gave it the
right to explore all the common sources of supply named in the order.
Amoco based its argument on the theory that its rights to explore all the
other formations named in the order vested and were no longer vulnerable
to extinguishment once it drilled the Hunnicutt No. 1.62 Amoco claimed
that the Commission's second order, 63 giving Bartex and Berexco the right
to participate in the subsequent wells, improperly extinguished its vested
rights in the common sources and violated the force pooling statute and
the substantive due process clauses of the United States64 and Oklahoma 65
Constitutions.
66
56. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 50, at 7-13.
57. Id. at 5-6.
58. Okla. Corp. Comm'n Order No. 270540 (Dec. 20, 1984).
59. Id. at 14.
60. Id. at 19.
61. Okla. Corp. Comm'n Order No. 199609 (Oct. 1, 1981).
62. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751 P.2d 203, 205 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
See also infra text accompanying notes 65-66.
63. Okla. Corp. Comm'n Order No. 270540 (Dec. 20, 1984).
64. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
65. OIaA. Co sT. art. II, § 7. Both the United States and Oklahoma constitutions provide
that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Id.;
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Oklahoma constitution further provides that:
No private property shall be taken or damaged for private use, with or without
compensation, unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity,
or for drains and ditches across lands of others for agricultural, mining, or sanitary
purposes, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.
OKLA. CO NST. art. II, § 23.
66. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 205. See also Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 50, at
55-57.
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The Court of Appeals accepted Amoco's argument and focused on four
areas in reversing the Commission. The court reasoned that:
(1) The order allowing a second election to participate in the
unit was not consistent with the plain meaning of the forced
pooling statute,
(2) The order allowing a second election to participate in the
unit was not consistent with the forced pooling statute's require-
ment of equity.
(3) The action by the Commission violated the principles of
substantive due process.
(4) The Commission exceeded its jurisdiction.61
The Amoco court concluded that vesting of the right to explore all
common sources named in the pooling order occurred once the time for
elections under the pooling order passed.6 8 According to the court, to hold
otherwise would be inequitable.6 9 The court reasoned that the participating
parties had invested risk capital in drilling the initial well, and this investment
would be lost if the option to participate in the increase density wells was
given to those who had not taken the risk of drilling the initial well.
7 0
In addition, the Amoco court held that the Commission exceeded its
jurisdiction when it determined that the fourteen month period between the
completion of the Hunnicutt No. I and the commencement of operations
on the Hunnicutt No. 2 clearly separated the two wells so that the Hunnicutt
No. 2 fell outside the perimeters of the original pooling order.7 1 The court
stated that the Commission's finding was an attempt to determine title in
a vested property interest which is clearly beyond the scope of the Com-
mission's jurisdiction.
72
Is Unit Pooling Mandated by the Plain Meaning of the Statute?
In holding the opportunity for a second election to be inconsistent with
the Oklahoma pooling statute, the Amoco court emphasized the legislature's
use of the word "unit" in the pooling statute.7 3 The pooling statute provides
that owners are required to "pool and develop their lands in the 'spacing
unit as a unit'." 74 Focusing on this language, the court concluded that the
statute mandates unit pooling rather than borehole pooling.7 5
67. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 205-06.
68. Id. at 207.
69. See id. at 206-07.
70. Id. at 207.
71. Id. at 208.
72. Id.
73. 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1988). For the text of the pertinent parts of this provision,
see supra notes 26 & 29.
74. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751 P.2d 203, 206 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986)
(quoting 52 OK.. STAT. § 87.1(e) (1981)) (emphasis added by the court).
75. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 206.
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Bartex and Berexco contended that the legislature intended pooling to be
by the borehole because the statute refers to "a well" being drilled or
proposed. 76 Bartex and Berexco pointed to three cases in which they con-
tended the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals condoned
pooling by the borehole. 77 One of the cases Bartex and Berexco relied on
was Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Sledge.78 In Woods, the court stated in
dicta that "[w]hen Woods applied to increase the density and drill three
additional oil wells, it was within the purview of the Commission to adjust
the equities on the three proposed wells" 79 and require new pooling orders
and elections for each well. The Amoco court pointed out that the issue of
whether the Commission's order was a proper adjustment was not the issue
on appeal in Woods, and the quoted response was dicta. 0 Similarly, the
Amoco court distinguished the other two cases cited by Bartex and Berexco
by determining that pooling by the wellbore was not at issue in those cases.,
In support of its decision in Amoco, the court pointed to Helmerich &
Payne, Inc. v. Corporation Commission. 2 In Helmerich & Payne, the owners
of the right to drill appealed a Commission order which required them to
make their participation election83 on a unit which covered nine governmental
sections. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the pooling statute 4 is
restrictive in that the pooling is limited within a drilling and spacing unit
of 640 acres.8 5 The Amoco court focused on the language in Helmerich &
Payne which stated that pooling statute is restrictive. The Amoco court
stated "[t]his rule applies not only when the Corporation Commission pools
more than a single drilling and spacing unit but also when the Corporation
Commission tries to limit pooling to a single wellbore. ' '8 6 Therefore, ac-
cording to the Amoco court, pooling by the borehole was not permitted.
87
However, just as in the three cases relied on by Bartex and Berexco, the
issue in Helmerich & Payne was not whether it is proper to pool by the
borehole. Thus, the case should not carry any more weight than the other
cases presented on the point. Looking at the plain language of the statute
and the cases discussed by the court in Amoco, the one clear point is that
neither the statute nor the case law directly addresses the issue of whether
a forced pooling order covers the unit or the borehole.
76. Id. See also 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(a) (Supp. 1988).
77. Bartex and Berexco cited the following cases for support of their argument that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of Appeals have supported pooling by the
borehole: Woods Petroleum Corp. v. Sledge, 632 P.2d 393 (Okla. 1981); O'Niel v. American
Quasar Petroleum Co., 617 P.2d 181 (Okla. 1980); Southern Union Prod. Co. v. Eason Oil Co.,
540 P.2d 603 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
78. 632 P.2d 393 (Okla. 1981).
79. Id. at 396.
80. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751 P.2d 203, 206 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
81. Id.
82. 532 P.2d 419 (Okla. 1975).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
84. 52 OxLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1988).
85. Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. Corporation Comm'n, 532 P.2d 419, 422 (Okla. 1975).
86. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751 P.2d 203, 206 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
87. Id. at 208.
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Is Unit Pooling Mandated by Equity?
Because the pooling statute does not directly address the issue of whether
a forced pooling order covers a unit or a borehole, the Amoco court
emphasized the need for fairness to the parties as the principal reason for
determining that a forced pooling order covers increased density wells in a
unit. 8 The court focused on the forced pooling statute requirements that a
pooling order be on terms which are "just and reasonable" and which will
afford "the owner of [a] tract in the unit the opportunity to recover or
receive... his just and fair share of the oil and gas." 9 The court determined
that "[i]t is not reasonable to strip a prudent operator of the property rights
he has purchased." 90 Therefore, the court concluded "[plooling by the
wellbore is not just and reasonable." 9'
Bartex and Berexco argued that the only rights Amoco acquired were the
rights to operate the Hunnicutt No. 1 and recover production from those
formations tested or established to be productive in that borehole. Therefore,
according to Bartex and Berexco the formations not tested within a reason-
able time after the pooling order was issued were no longer subject to the
forced pooling order and were not purchased by the operator. 92 The Com-
mission found that the fourteen month period Amoco delayed after drilling
the Hunnicutt No. 1 to the Springer formation was more than enough time
in which to test the formations above the Springer formation.93 Therefore,
according to Bartex and Berexco, because Amoco failed to test the forma-
tions above the Springer formation within a reasonable period of time, these
formations were no longer subject to the original forced pooling order.
Thus, Bartex and Berexco argued a new forced pooling order with new
elections was necessary.
94
The Amoco court rejected this argument and declared that "[r]equiring
an operator to complete in every potentially productive formation in the
initial well or lose those formations not tested is not just and reasonable
and often impossible." 9 Citing Crest Resources v. Corporation Commis-
sion,96 the Amoco court concluded that once the time for elections under
the pooling order passed, the interests of the affected parties vested in the
operator and were no longer vulnerable to extinguishment. Therefore, ac-
88. Id. at 206-07.
89. Id. at 206 (quoting 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e) (1981)).
90. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 206.
91. Id.
92. Answer Brief of Appellee, Bartex Exploration, Inc. at 10 & 18-19 [hereinafter Answer
Brief of Bartex], Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751 P.2d 203 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986)
(No. 63664).
93. Okla. Corp. Comm'n Order No. 270540 14 (Dec. 20, 1984).
94. Answer Brief of Bartex, supra 92, at 18-20; Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Bartex
Exploration, Inc. at 6-7; Brief of Appellee, Berexco, Inc., In Support of Petition for Rehearing
at 8, 11 [hereinafter Rehearing Brief of Berexco], Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751
P.2d 203, 206 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (No. 63664). Bartex's and Berexco's argument reflected the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission ruling at Okla. Corp. Comm'n Order No. 270540 (Dec. 20,
1984).
95. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 206-07.
96. 617 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1980).
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cording to the Amoco court, the right to drill was no longer vulnerable to
extinguishment and no new elections were permissible. 97 In other words, the
Amoco court's interpretation of Crest Resources established the basis on
which it could find that there was no need to pool the Hunnicutt No, 2
well because it was included in the original pooling order.98
In Crest Resources, the issue was whether a forced pooling order could
be vacated because the Commission-designated operator transferred his
managerial responsibilities for the unit to another party by a private contract
agreement and because the estimated cost of the well subsequently in-
creased. 99 The court held that the managerial responsibility of a Commission
designated unit operator is not delegable.100 Therefore, according to the
Crest Resources court, the unapproved assignment of an operator's mana-
gerial responsibilities does not, per se, constitute a ground for vacating the
pooling order because the original operator is still responsible for the
operation of the well. Furthermore, according to the court, the estimated
costs in the forced pooling order were a projection of the reasonable expenses
to be charged and were subject to adjustment. 10 Therefore, according to
the Crest Resources court, neither an unapproved change of an operator
nor a change in the estimated cost of the well is grounds for the Commission
to vacate a prior pooling order.102 As part of its rationale for this ruling,
the court stated that once the time for elections has passed, the property
interests of the affected parties vest in the operator. Therefore, these parties
can no longer challenge the forced pooling order's validity based on the
unapproved appointment of the operator nor the increase in the cost of the
well.103
The Crest Resources court's determination that vesting occurs at the end
of the election period must be interpreted in light of the issue in the case.
The court in Crest Resources was determining whether the pooling order
could be vacated because of an unauthorized delegation of the operator's
managerial responsibilities and the subsequent increase in the estimated cost
of drilling the well. The case should not be interpreted as holding that
property rights to all named formations are not vulnerable to extinguishment
at the end of the election period.
In order for a forced pooling order to be applicable to a subsequent well,
the initial well must produce in paying quantities.1° Thus, the interest which
97. See Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 207-08.
98. Id.
99. Crest Resources, 617 P.2d at 216-17.
100. Id. at 218.
101. Id..at 218.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Nilsen v. Ports of Call Oil Co., 711 P.2d 98, 102 (Okla. 1985) (interpreting Southern
Union Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 465 P.2d 454 (Okla. 1970)).
Production in paying quantities has been defined as "[p]roduction in such quantity as to enable
the operator to realize a profit." There are a number of different theories as to what "profit"
entails. See 8 O. AND GAs LAw at 760-61.
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vests in the operator at the end of the election period is at most a defeasible
fee. 105 Because a forced pooling order is in the nature of a defeasible fee,
it was incorrect for the Amoco court to interpret Crest Resources as holding
that an operator's rights to the formations named in a forced pooling order
are not vulnerable to extinguishment.
The defeasible fee requires the operator to discover at least one formation
that is capable of production in paying quantities. Therefore, one can argue,
as Bartex and Berexco did, that only formations tested within a reasonable
time after the pooling order issues are purchased. There are also other ways
of determining which formations are purchased. For example, one can argue
that only the producing formation(s) are purchased, or that only those
formations shown to be capable of producing in paying quantities should
be considered purchased, or that the formations tested which show capacity
to produce are purchased, or that only formations which appear on the
geological well log '06 are purchased, or that all formations named in the
forced pooling order are purchased.
The Amoco court continued with its equitable analysis by focusing on
the benefits and risks involved in oil and gas exploration. The court directed
attention to the fact that elections to participate are made prior to the first
well. At that point, the parties make their elections based on certain
information or lack of information about possible production in the unit.
The court found that "lilt is not fair or just to alter the positions of the
interest owners after the initial well is drilled."' 07 In other words, according
to the court, it is not fair to give those who chose not to participate in the
first well the option to participate in future wells, once more information
is obtained about the likelihood of production in the unit.
The Amoco court concluded that "new elections deprive the original risk
capital investors of rights earned by taking the risk of the initial well."'u0
According to the court, the right earned by this initial investment was the
right to receive a just and fair share of the oil and gas.'19 The court reasoned
that if a second election were given to those who chose to not participate
in the initial well, the owners who chose to participate would not be able
to receive their just and fair share of the production. In other words,
according to the court, by participating in the initial well and taking the
risks associated with that well, the owners earned the right to receive a
greater share of the production in the increased density wells. The court
realized that drilling the initial well gives everyone more geological data
105. But see Nesbitt, The Forced Pooling Order: How Long? How Wide? How Deep?, 52
OKLA. B.J. 2799, 2804-05 (1981). The author contends that because a forced pooling order contains
no definite provision for the termination of the order, the life of the order could include "a
temporary cessation of production, or even resumption of drilling after the initial well ceased
production and was plugged." Id.
106. A defeasible fee is an estate in fee that may be defeated by some future contingency.
BLAcK's LAw DicnioNARY 376 (5th ed. 1979).
107. See supra note 40.
108. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751 P.2d 203, 207 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
109. Id.
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about the formations in the unit, thus increasing the likelihood of successful
increased density wells. Therefore, according to the court, those who paid
for the data should be able to reap the benefits from it without having to
share the profits with those who did not take the risks."0
Because the Amoco decision is based in part on equalizing the benefits
and risks involved in oil and gas exploration, and because the benefits
and risks are different for each well drilled, many questions have arisen
concerning the proper balance between the benefits and risks under facts
distinguishable from Amoco. Therefore, the question remains whether
borehole pooling would be appropriate under circumstances distinguishable
from, Amoco.
The Requirements of Substantive Due Process
The Amoco court also held that the Commission's finding of borehole
pooling violated federal"' and state ' 2 substantive due process require-
ments. The court found that the Commission ruling resulted in an "ar-
bitrary forfeiture of property rights"" 3 which violates both constitutions."14
The Commission derives its authority from the police power of the state.
This power extends to protecting correlative rights of owners in a common
source of supply and may be exercised by regulating the drilling of the
wells."15 Due process requires the Commission's actions to have a "fair
and reasonable impact"1"6 on the property rights in question."
7
Th Amoco court previously determined that the Commission's second
ruling did not have a fair and reasonable impact on the vested property
rights of the owners participating in the initial well." 8 Therefore, according
to the court, substantive due process was violated." 9
Clearly, substantive due process protects vested property rights, and the
police power of the Commission is subject to substantive due process
limitations. 20 However, because the Amoco court based its decision in
part on equitable grounds of fairness and the reasonable actions of a
prudent operator, the issue of whether borehole pooling violates substan-
tive due process is also based on the equities involved. Therefore, if the
court ever finds that equity dictates that a forced pooling order is appli-
cable to a single borehole then vesting of property rights would occur only
in that borehole. Thus, substantive due process would not be violated by
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See supra note 64.
113. See supra note 65.
114. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751 P.2d 203, 207 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 207. See also Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P.2d 83, 89
(Okla. 1988); Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. Corporation Comm'n, 532 P.2d 419 (Okla. 1975).
117. City of Edmond v. Wakefield, 537 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Okla. 1975).
118. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 207.
119. Id. at 206-07.
120. Id. at 208.
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giving a second election to those who did not participate in the first well.
Jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission
In Amoco, the court held that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction
when it determined that the fourteen-month period, between the completion
of the Hunnicutt No. 1 and the commencement of the Hunnicutt No. 2
exceeded a reasonable period of time in which to attempt a completion or
testing of other formations. 2' The Commission held that, because Amoco
exceeded a reasonable time period, the same forced pooling order did not
govern both wells. 22 This ruling allowed the nonparticipating owners in
the first well to make new elections on the second well. The Amoco court
determined that this finding by the Commission was a determination of
title in vested property rights. 23
A well-settled rule is that the Commission may not determine title to
vested property rights. 24 The Commission may amend or modify its pool-
ing orders as to subsequent wells drilled under the orders if it is shown
there is a change of conditions or a change in knowledge of conditions.'
25
The Commission may also clarify or interpret previous orders to determine
whether specific operations are within the scope of the order or if the
parties have complied with an order.' 26 The disputes arise over defining
these terms and applying them to specific facts.
The Amoco court relied on Nilsen v. Ports of Call Oil Co. 2 7 in deter-
mining that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction. 28 In Nilsen, Ports
of Call Oil Co. obtained a forced pooling order directing it to begin
drilling a unit well within 180 days from the date of the order. Ports of
Call commenced a well within the 180 day period, but the borehole was
lost after a series of blow outs 29 caused by high pressure gas deposits.
This borehole was plugged and a second well was commenced. Again the
borehole was lost due to blow outs. Ports of Call commenced a third well
and completed it as a producing well. The second and third wells were
commenced after the 180 day period provided for in the Commission
order. 3 0
121. Id. at 207.
122. Id. at 208.
123. Okla. Corp. Comm'n Order No. 270540 15, 18 (Dec. 20, 1984).
124. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 208.
125. See Nilsen v. Ports of Call Oil Co., 711 P.2d 98, 103 n.15 (Okla. 1985); Southern Union
Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 465 P.2d 454, 457 (Okla. 1970).
126. Nilsen, 711 P.2d at 102. See Carter Oil Co. v. State, 205 Okla. 374, 238 P.2d 300, 303
(1951). See also French v. Champlin Exploration, Inc., 534 P.2d 1302 (Okla. 1975); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 482 P.2d 607 (Okla. 1971); Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 205 Okla. 534, 239 P.2d 1021 (1950).
127. Cabot Carbon Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 287 P.2d 675, 679 (Okla. 1955); Nilsen v.
Ports of Call Oil Co., 711 P.2d 98, 102-03 (Okla. 1985).
128. 711 P.2d 98 (Okla. 1985).
129. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751 P.2d 203, 208 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
130. A blow out is "al sudden, violent expulsion of oil, gas and mud (and sometimes water)
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The parties who had elected not to participate in the initial well challenged
Ports of Call's right to drill the wells commenced after the 180 day period.
One of the parties made a challenge in the form of an application to the
Commission for a new forced pooling order. Another party made a challenge
in district court. In this suit, the petitioner sought to quiet title to the oil
and gas leases he acquired in the section.'
The Commission found that a determination of whether Ports of Call's
operations had constituted continuous drilling fell outside its authority to
"repeal, amend, modify, or supplement' ' 32 previous orders. The Commis-
sion determined that this was a quiet title action to be decided by the district
court. The district court held that it had no jurisdiction over the matter
because the suit was an impermissible collateral attack on a Commission
order. 113
The Nilsen court held that the Commission had jurisdiction to determine
whether the acts of Ports of Call constituted continuous operations within
the terms of the forced pooling order because such a determination was a
clarification of its previous order. The court concluded that the Commission
had the jurisdiction to determine whether a forced pooling order "ceased
by its own terms to be of force and effect."'
3 4
The Nilsen court stated that the district court had the power to adjudicate
the legal effect of the forced pooling order on the private interests in-
volved, 3 1 but the Commission had jurisdiction to determine the precise
question presented in the case. That question was whether the acts of Ports
of Call constituted continuous operations within the terms of the forced
pooling order. 3 The court stated that "where the parties, such as here, are
conducting operations under a Commission-imposed pooling order, and the
question sought to be litigated arises from the construction of that pooling
order, the proper forum to decide the question of construction is the
Corporation Commission."' 37
Amoco distinguished Nilsen by noting that the issue in Nilsen was whether
the continuing operations were within the scope of the pooling order. In
Amoco, according to the court, the Commission was not determining whether
there had been compliance with the order, but was determining whether
title had vested in Amoco. 38
from a drilling well, followed by an uncontrolled flow from the well. It occurs when high pressure
gas is encountered in the hole and sufficient precautions, such as increasing the weight of the
mud, have not been taken." 8 Om AN GAs LAW at 85.
131. Nilsen v. Ports of Call Oil Co., 711 P.2d 98, 100 (Okla. 1985).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 100-01.
135. Id. at 102.
136. Id. at 103. See also Southern Union Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 465 P.2d 454
(Okla. 1970).
137. Nilsen, 711 P.2d at 103.
138. Id.
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Bartex and Berexco argued that this case was not a dispute over property
rights but rather a request for a clarification of the Commission's original
forced pooling order.'3 9 According to Bartex and Berexco, the Commission's
decision determined that Amoco had not earned the rights to the Red Fork
formation (the formation to which the Hunnicutt No. 2 was drilled) because
it failed to abide by the conditions under which such rights would vest.
Vesting, according to Bartex and Berexco, was conditioned on the comple-
tion of the Hunnicutt No. 1 in the Red Fork formation, or at a minimum,
for the Hunnicutt No. I to have vested in the Red Fork.'
40
The Amoco court's ruling on the jurisdiction of the Commission is valid
if it is assumed the property rights to the Red Fork formation vested in
Amoco when it drilled the Hunnicutt No. 1. Otherwise, Nilsen supports
Berexco's argument that the jurisdictional issue was whether the drilling of
the Hunnicutt No. 2 was within the scope of the pooling order. Because
the Amoco decision was based in part on equitable grounds of fairness and
the reasonable actions of a prudent operator, if borehole pooling was found
to be equitable, Bartex's and Berexco's view of the Commission's jurisdiction
could prevail. In other words, the issue of whether a forced pooling order
pertains to the unit or the borehole could easily arise from the construction
of the pooling order. Therefore, the Commission would be the proper forum
for deciding the issue.
Subsequent Cases Address Issues Raised in Amoco
Two subsequent decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court have addressed
some of the questions raised by Amoco.14 1 In both cases the appellant
attempted to distinguish Amoco and argued that the unit was forced pooled
to the borehole and not the unit. In both cases, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that Amoco was applicable, that the property rights in question
were pooled by the original order of the Commission, and that no new
election could be made on the drilling of the increased density wells. 42
In Ranola Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission, 43 the facts were basically
the same as in Amoco. After the Commission issued a forced pooling order
for the initial unit well, the operator applied to the Commission for per-
mission to drill an increased density well. The operator eventually drilled
three increased density wells.1"4
Ranola is distinguished from Amoco on two grounds. First, the original
well and the increased density wells were all drilled to the same formation
139. Amoco Prod. Co., 751 P.2d at 208.
140. Answer Brief of Bartex, supra note 92, at 16; Rehearing Brief of Berexco, supra note 94,
at 12-13.
141. Some of the issues raised in Amoco have been addressed in Ranola Oil Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 752 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1988), and Inexco Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 767 P.2d
404 (Okla. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1943 (1989).
142. Ranola Oil Co., 752 P.2d at 1118-20; Inexco Oil Co., 767 P.2d at 405.
143. 752 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1988).
144. Id. at 1117.
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in Ranola. Second, Ranola received its interest from a leasehold owner who
had been forced pooled without making an election under the original forced
pooling order. 45 Pursuant to the forced pooling statute, 46 the original
pooling order stated that if no election was made the nonparticipating lessee
would be considered to have elected a cash bonus as consideration. 47 Ranola
sought to participate retroactively in the three wells by paying its propor-
tionate part of the drilling costs. Like Bartex and Berexco in Amoco, Ranola
argued that the language of the forced pooling order only referred to the
initial well. 48
The issue in Ranola was whether the acceptance of the bonus in lieu of
participation pursuant to a forced pooling order operated as an assignment
and prevented the taker of the bonus from participating as a matter of
right in subsequent increased density wells. 149 Referring to the Amoco de-
cision, the Ranola court stated that a mineral interest owner's election to
accept bonus payments in lieu of participation under a forced pooling order
acts as a sale of his leasehold rights.5 0 Furthermore, according to the Ranola
court, a successor in interest to the owner of an oil and gas lease can only
assert the same interest as conveyed by the predecessor in interest.,' There-
fore, the court held that the acceptance of the bonus acted as an assignment
to the operator of the leasehold interest in the exploratory rights in the
formation to which the increased density wells were drilled. 52
As in Amoco, the Ranola court focused on equalizing the benefits and
risks involved in oil and gas exploration. 53 The Ranola court stated that
the purpose of forced pooling is to equalize the risk of loss by forcing all
the owners of the right to drill to choose in advance whether they will share
in both the benefits and risks of oil and gas exploration by participating.
5 4
The court stated that by not allowing a second election in the increased
density wells, the risks between the bonus takers and those who participate
in the initial well are properly allocated. According to the court, to allow
a successor in interest to the pooled interest "to reap the rewards of
development while avoiding the risks would be inequitable.' 'P55
In Inexco Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission,'56 a dispute arose at the
time of the original pooling as to the best location for drilling the proposed
well. Inexco's geological interpretation pointed to the southwest quarter of
145. Id.
146. 52 OsjA. STAT. § 87.1 (Supp. 1988).
147. Ranola Oil Co., 752 P.2d at 1117.
148. Brief of Appellant, Ranola Oil Co., at 6-7, Ranola Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 752
P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1988) (No. 61820).
149. Ranola Oil Co., 752 P.2d at 1118-19.
150. Id. at 1118-19.
151. Id. at 1118.
152. Id. at 1119.
153. Id. at 1118-20.
154. Id. at 1119.
155. Id.
156. 767 P.2d 404 (Okla. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1943 (1989).
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the section involved, while other leasehold owners argued that the northwest
quarter of the section was the best location. Inexco's view prevailed, and
it was appointed as operator of the unit well. This determination prompted
the leasehold owners who were in disagreement to elect not to participate
in the proposed well.157
Inexco drilled the Wolfe No. 1 well in the center of the southwest quarter
of the section, and the completion confirmed the geological interpretation
of the other leasehold owners that the well location was less than optimal.
The Wolfe No. 1 was only a marginal producer of gas from the Des Moines
common source of supply.
158
By separate application, Inexco and Ward Petroleum Corporation (one
of the nonparticipating leasehold owners) applied to the Commission to drill
an increased density well in order to properly recover the hydrocarbons in
the Des Moines common source of supply. The Commission held that those
who had elected not to participate in drilling the Wolfe No. 1 had surren-
dered their drilling rights to that well, but they had retained all rights to
participate in the increased density well. Ward was appointed the operator
of this second well.1
59
Ward then drilled the Albright Farms No. 1 well in the northwest quarter
of the same section. This was the location Ward and the other leasehold
owners who had elected not to participate in the Wolfe No. 1 well originally
thought to be the best. Completion confirmed their beliefs when the Albright
well proved to be a prolific producer of natural gas from the Des Moines
common source of supply.' 60 Inexco appealed the decision of the Commission
to allow elections to participate in the increased density well.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, relying on Amoco and Ranola, held that
the Commission's order allowing borehole pooling was clearly erroneous.' 6,
The court reasoned that the original order required the other owners of the
right to drill to participate in the cost of drilling and completing the Wolfe
No. 1 or accept a bonus in lieu of participation. The Inexco court stated
that once the election period passed, the property interests of the affected
parties vested. The court reasoned that by accepting the bonus, Ward
assigned its exploratory rights in all subsequent wells drilled in the unit to
Inexco, and could assert no right to participate in the subsequent increased
density wells. 162
Because Amoco, Ranola and Inexco are all based on balancing the benefits
and risks involved in oil and gas exploration, it seems logical to hold that
under certain circumstances the court could hold that equity requires bo-
rehole pooling. However, if pooling by the borehole is ever going to be
157. Answer Brief of Appellee Nova Energy Corporation at 6, Inexco Oil Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 767 P.2d 404 (Okla. 1988) (No. 64455), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1943 (1989).
158. Id. at 6.
159. Id. at 7.
160. Id. at 8.
161. Inexco Oil Co., 767 P.2d at 405.
162. Id.
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upheld by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the court would have done so in
Inexco. As the Inexco facts demonstrate, 6 ' it does not seem to be just and
reasonable' to require an owner of the right to drill to risk his capital in a
well he believes will be unproductive when he also believes that another
location within the unit would result in a productive well. Thus, the facts
in Inexco appear to demonstrate equitable grounds for permitting borehole
pooling.
However, assuming borehole pooling was permissible when there was i
disagreement as to location, many questions would still remain. Some of
these questions include whether borehole pooling would remain the standard
for all the increased density wells drilled in the unit, or whether the
nonparticipating, owners would only be allowed to participate in the well at
the location it preferred at the initial pooling. Perhais, under the latter
circumstance, the owners of the right to drill should be required, in advance
of any drilling in thd unit, to select the locations of the wells in which they
would choose to participate. The possibilities for grounds and times for
elections are almost unlimited when based on the equities involved in
different circumstances. Hence, the better approach may be to have a specific
rule which is riot based on equity so that all the parties to a forced pooling
order will know they must participate in the initial well drilled in the unit
Or lose their right to participate in any increased density wells.
If the rationale behind the Amoco decision was the court's realization
that a standard rule which would apply in all circumstances was needed,
then the court should have specifically set forth unit pooling as a rule.
Because the Amoco court based its decision at least in part on equitable
grounds, the parties in Ranola and Inexco questioned the effect of the
forced pooling order to the increased density wells under the facts specific
to each of those cases. Similarly, others in the oil and gas industry still
question how Amoco will apply in facts distinguishable from Amoco. Today,
based on the Ranola and Inexco decisions, the prudent owner of a right to
drill should not expect to participate in any increased density wells drilled
in the unit if the owner elected not to participate in the initial well in the
unit. However, because Amoco was based on equitable grounds, the question
of whether borehole pooling will be upheld at some later date remains open.
Conclusion
The purpose of a forced pooling order is to protect the correlative rights
of all the owners in a drilling and spacing unit while avoiding the drilling
of unnecessary wells. A forced pooling order imposes a forced election on
uncommitted interest owners as to the disposition of their interest in the
unit.
In Amoco, the court held that "[p]ooling by the wellbore is not just and
reasonable"'' and that "granting a second election [for an increased density
163. See supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
164. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 751 P.2d 203, 206-07 (Okla. Ct. App. 1988).
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well] is a deprivation of a property right of the initial risk capital inves-
tors. ' ' 6 Because Amoco is based in part on equitable grounds, the question
of whether borehole pooling will be upheld at some later date remains open.
However, after reading Ranola and Inexco in light of Amoco, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the Oklahoma Supreme Court will determine
that once an election to participate in the initial well in a unit is made, that
election will stand for all wells drilled to any formation which was named
in the forced pooling order. Also, the election will bind any subsequent
owner of the interest for which the election was made without regard for
the reason for such election. In failing to set forth a standard rule which
would apply in all circumstances, the Amoco court missed an opportunity
to conclusively address the issue of unit versus borehole pooling.
Linda R. Correll
165. Id.
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